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TROLL STORMS AND TORT LIABILITY 
FOR SPEECH URGING ACTION BY OTHERS: 
A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS AND 
AN INITIAL STEP TOWARD A FEDERAL RULE 
CLAY CALVERT* 
ABSTRACT 
This Commentary examines when, consistent with First Amendment 
principles of free expression, speakers can be held tortiously responsible 
for the actions of others with whom they have no contractual or employer-
employee relationship. It argues that recent lawsuits against Daily Stormer 
publisher Andrew Anglin for sparking “troll storms” provide a timely 
analytical springboard into the issue of vicarious tort liability. 
Furthermore, such liability is particularly problematic when a speaker’s 
message urging action does not fall into an unprotected category of 
expression, such as incitement or true threats, and thus, were it not for tort 
law, would be fully protected. 
In examining the possibility of vicarious tort liability, this Commentary 
reviews the U.S. Supreme Court’s “authorized, directed, or ratified” test 
for vicarious liability, which was established more than thirty-five years ago 
in the pre-Internet-era case of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. The 
Commentary concludes by proposing a framework for vicarious liability 
when speakers urge action that results in others’ tortious conduct.  
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In November 2018, a federal judge in Montana refused to dismiss Tanya 
Gersh’s tort claims against Andrew Anglin for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress1 and invasion of privacy2 in Gersh v. Anglin.3 Anglin, 
“[o]ne of America’s most prominent neo-Nazis,” 4  operates the Daily 
Stormer.5 It has been described as “the Internet’s most notorious neo-Nazi 
	
1. Under the Montana law applicable in Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958 (D. Mont. 2018), 
“[a]n independent cause of action for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress arises under 
circumstances where 1) serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was 2) the reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of 3) the defendant’s negligent or intentional act or omission.” Wages v. First 
Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 79 P.3d 1095, 1098 (Mont. 2003); see also Czajkowski v. Meyers, 172 P.3d 94, 
100–01 (Mont. 2007) (stating that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress “arises 
when a plaintiff suffers serious and severe emotional distress as a reasonably foreseeable consequence 
of a defendant’s intentional act or omission”).  
Significantly, Montana’s definition of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) does not 
require proof that the defendant’s conduct was outrageous. See Maloney v. Home & Inv. Ctr., Inc., 994 
P.2d 1124, 1134–35 (Mont. 2000) (observing that the element of “outrageousness” was eliminated by 
the Supreme Court of Montana in Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411 (Mont. 1995)). 
This contrasts with the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of IIED, which provides that “[o]ne 
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to 
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added). Indeed, IIED typically “consists of four elements: (1) the 
defendant’s conduct must be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable, 
(3) the defendant’s conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and (4) the distress must be 
severe.”  Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts:  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Cause of 
Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000). 
2. Under the Montana law applicable in Gersh, a common law cause of action for invasion of 
privacy by intrusion “is defined as a ‘wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities in such a manner 
as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.’” 
Rucinsky v. Hentchel, 881 P.2d 616, 618 (Mont. 1994) (quoting Sistok v. Nw. Tel. Sys., Inc., 615 P.2d 
176, 182 (Mont. 1980)). 
3. Gersh, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 969–70. The court also refused to dismiss a cause of action based 
on a Montana anti-intimidation statute. Id. at 970–71; see MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1503(2) (2019) 
(“An individual or organization who is attempting to exercise a legally protected right and who is injured, 
harassed, or aggrieved by a threat or intimidation has a civil cause of action against the person engaging 
in the threatening or intimidating behavior.”).  
In July 2019, U.S. Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch recommended that default judgment be 
granted in favor of Tanya Gersh after Andrew Anglin failed to appear at a properly noticed deposition 
in April 2019. Gersh v. Anglin, No. CV 17-50-M-DLC-JCL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134688, at *2, *6 
(D. Mont. July 15, 2019). Magistrate Lynch also recommended that Gersh be awarded $4,042,438 in 
compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. at *6. Furthermore, Lynch 
recommended “a permanent injunction ordering Anglin to remove from his website the blog posts 
encouraging his readers to contact Gersh, her family and, especially, her son, including all photographs 
and images of the family and comment boards associated therewith.” Id. In August 2019, U.S. District 
Chief Judge Dana L. Christensen adopted in full Magistrate Lynch’s findings and recommendations, 
remarking that default judgment was “an appropriate sanction for Anglin’s absolute refusal to defend.” 
Gersh v. Anglin, No. CV 17-50-M-DLC-JCL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133795, at *2 (D. Mont. Aug. 8, 
2019). 
4. Matt Pearce, White Nationalism Faltered, but Gab Was Its Safe Harbor, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
29, 2018, at A2. 
5. See Trip Gabriel, A Bullhorn of Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric, Long Before Trump Started, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2019, at A10 (describing Anglin as “the founder of the neo-Nazi Daily Stormer”); see 













website, featuring sections including ‘Jewish Problem’ and ‘Race War.’”6 
The Daily Stormer, as this Commentary explains, plays a pivotal role in 
Gersh v. Anglin. 
Tanya Gersh, a Jewish real estate agent from Whitefish, Montana, 7 
contends that Anglin, a “pale prince of extremism,” 8  lived up to that 
moniker by sparking a troll storm9 against her. The trouble began after 
Gersh and fellow Whitefish resident Sherry Spencer, the mother of alt-right 
leader Richard Spencer, 10  had a falling out over a possible real estate 
transaction.11 The spat drew Anglin’s attention after Sherry Spencer, who 
owns a commercial property,12 wrote on Medium that “Gersh had tried to 
threaten and extort her into agreeing to sell her building . . . and denouncing 
her son’s views.”13 
Spencer’s accusation prompted Anglin in December 2016 to publish on 
the Daily Stormer “Gersh’s phone numbers, email addresses, and social 
media profiles, as well as those of her husband, twelve-year-old son, friends, 
and colleagues. Anglin asked readers to ‘[t]ell them you are sickened by 
	
TRIB., Dec. 31, 2017, at 5A (noting that Anglin’s website “takes its name from Der Stürmer, a newspaper 
that published Nazi propaganda”). 
6. Matt Pearce, Notorious Neo-Nazi Site Was Built with Father’s Help, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 
2018, at A2. 
7. Kimberly Winston, Fighting Neo-Nazis with Faith, Peace and Allies, STATE J.-REG. 
(Springfield, Ill.), May 13, 2018, at P30. 
8. Stephen Koff, Top Ohio Neo-Nazi Playing Hard to Get – Legal Process Servers Just Can’t 
Find Him, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 30, 2017, at A1. 
9. Troll is slang for “a person who purposefully posts offensive comments in order to antagonize 
others.” Carissa Byrne Hessick, Towards a Series of Academic Norms for #Lawprof Twitter, 101 MARQ. 
L. REV. 903, 921 n.63 (2018); see PNINA FICHMAN & MADELYN R. SANFILIPPO, ONLINE TROLLING 
AND ITS PERPETRATORS: UNDER THE CYBERBRIDGE 6 (2016) (defining “online trolling as a 
repetitive, disruptive online deviant behavior by an individual toward other individuals and groups,” 
noting the “media’s misappropriation of the term to describe various acts of online deviance and 
disobedience,” and pointing out the “[l]ack of clarity and agreement about what constitutes a troll” 
(emphasis in original)).  
10. Richard Spencer, the president of the National Policy Institute, is “a prominent white 
nationalist” who “is credited with coining the term ‘alternative right,’ or ‘alt-right,’ almost a decade 
ago.” Anemona Hartocollis, University of Florida Braces for Appearance by White Nationalist, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2017, at A17. Spencer was “one of the main organizers of the ‘Unite the Right’ rally” 
in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017 that resulted “in a violent confrontation at the downtown site 
of the historic Robert E. Lee statue. The chaotic melee led to the death of Heather Heyer in a car-
ramming attack and of two State Police officers in a helicopter accident, as well as dozens of injuries.” 
James Loeffler, The Shadow Over Charlottesville, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2018, at C4. 
11. Complaint for Invasion of Privacy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and 
Violations of the Anti-Intimidation Act at 5–7, Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958 (D. Mont. 2018) 
(No. 9:17-CV-00050-DLC-JCL) [hereinafter Gersh Complaint], https://www.splcenter.org/sites/defaul 
t/files/documents/whitefish_complaint_finalstamped.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV7A-HPWC].	
12. See Phil Drake & Seaborn Larson, Neo-Nazi Invoked Racist ‘Troll Storm,’ Lawsuit Alleges, 
USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 2017, at 8A (reporting that Sherry Spencer owns “a mixed-use commercial 
building” in Whitefish, Montana). 
13. Gersh Complaint, supra note 11, at 7. 











their Jew agenda to attack and harm the mother of someone whom they 
disagree with.’”14 One of Anglin’s posts, which followed the all-capitalized 
heading “TAKE ACTION,” read, “This is very important. Calling these 
people up and/or sending them a quick message is very easy. It is very 
important that we make them feel the kind of pressure they are making us 
feel.”15 Another implored, “Let’s Hit Em Up[.]  Are y’all ready for an old 
fashioned Troll Storm?  Because AYO – it’s that time, fam.”16 
According to Gersh’s complaint, these posts and others by Anglin caused 
her to receive “hundreds of hateful and threatening anti-Semitic phone calls, 
voicemails, text messages, emails, letters, social media comments, and false 
online business reviews.”17  Among the messages Gersh received across 
different forms of media were: 
• “Ratfaced criminals who play with fire tend to get thrown in the 
oven.”18 
• “We are going to ruin you, you Kike PoS [piece of shit] . . . You 
will be driven to the brink of suicide . . . We will be there to take 
pleasure in your pain & eventual end.”19 
• “Worthless fuckin kike.”20 
• “You filthy piece of trash. You are threatening an old lady. You 
worthless piece of shit. I hope you die, you worthless cunt. You 
stupid ugly bitch.”21 
This “tsunami of threats,”22 as Gersh’s attorneys at the Southern Poverty 
Law Center labeled them, included ones of death23 and “[m]any messages 
referenced the Holocaust.”24 According to the Atlantic, one email bluntly 
stated, “[a]ll of you deserve a bullet through your skull.”25 Furthermore, 
Gersh’s young son, whom Anglin labeled a “scamming little kike” and a 
	
14. Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 962 (D. Mont. 2018). 
15. Gersh Complaint, supra note 11, at 20. 
16. Id. (alteration in original). 
17. Id. at 2. 
18. Id. at 4. 
19. Id. (first and second alteration in original). 
20. Id.  
21. Id. at 27. 
22. Id. at 4. 
23. Id. at 3.  
24. Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 963 (D. Mont. 2018).  















“creepy little faggot” on the Daily Stormer,26 received hateful messages on 
his Twitter account.27 
While clearly implicating free speech issues, Gersh v. Anglin is about 
much more than just hateful and offensive speech, which the United States 
Supreme Court has made clear is generally protected 28  by the First 
Amendment.29  Rather, Gersh revolves around what is commonly called 
doxing.30 Doxing typically involves “publicly posting private information 
as a form of revenge or punishment” 31  and occurs “when someone’s 
personal information is shared on the Internet without their consent.”32 
Through the lens of doxing, Gersh raises an important question that forms 
the heart of this Commentary—one which is sure to arise often in the digital 
era: When, consistent with First Amendment principles of free expression, 
should a person who urges action be held vicariously liable33 in tort law for 
	
26. Gersh Complaint, supra note 11, at 4. 
27. Id. For example, one message read, “ask your mommy why she hates white people so much 
and runs an extortion racket.” Id.  
28. As Justice Samuel Alito recently wrote, “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free 
speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” Matal v. Tam, 
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting)); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
29. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. The 
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety-five years ago through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties that cannot be impaired by state 
and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
30. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Tobriner Memorial Lecture: Free Speech on Campus, 69 
HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1353 (2018) (noting that the harm caused by doxing is somewhat akin to injury 
that the tort of public disclosure of private facts is designed to address, such as when “very private 
information is put on the internet about somebody, such as the fact that a person is undocumented or 
transgender”). 
31. Brittany Scott, Note, Waiving Goodbye to First Amendment Protections: First Amendment 
Waiver by Contract, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451, 476 (2019). 
32. Lisa Bei Li, Data Privacy in the Cyber Age: Recommendations for Regulating Doxing and 
Swatting, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 317, 318 (2018). 
33. Regarding vicarious liability in tort law, Professor Joseph H. King, Jr. explains that: 
[W]hen a victim suffers a tortious injury and the tortfeasor is party to a legally sufficient 
relationship with another, the victim may have a tort claim against the tortfeasor for his direct 
liability and against the other for vicarious liability (and occasionally for direct liability as well). 
Vicarious liability in general has three core requirements: First, there must be a legally 
sufficient relationship—one that the law recognizes will support the imposition of vicarious 
liability—between the person who caused the plaintiff’s injury (A) and the vicariously liable 
defendant (B). Second, A, whose conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury, must have been acting 
tortiously. And finally, the tortious conduct by A, the tortfeasor, must have occurred within the 
scope of the legally sufficient relationship with B, the person against whom vicarious liability 
is asserted.  
Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their Franchisees, 
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 427–28 (2005). Simply put, in vicarious liability situations, “courts treat 











the resulting conduct of others who are not acting as his servants in an 
agency relationship?34 
This question is especially contentious in cases like Gersh where the 
plaintiff does not assert that the defendant’s speech falls into an unprotected 
category of expression,35 such as incitement to violence.36 In other words, if 
Andrew Anglin’s speech is not an incitement to unlawful conduct under the 
test articulated by the Supreme Court a half-century ago in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio,37 how can he nonetheless be held responsible for inciting the troll 
storm against Tanya Gersh? Ultimately, this issue was never fully litigated 
in Gersh because Anglin stopped defending himself and default judgment 
was entered against him in August 2019.38 
	
employer and employee as the ‘same tortfeasor’ for purposes of liability.”  J.M. Balkin, Essay, Free 
Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2301 (1999). 
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“A servant is 
a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical 
conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control.”); Randy 
S. Parlee, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: Suggested Changes in the Law Through Policy 
Analysis, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 27, 30 (1984) (“It is elementary that a master or principal is liable for 
compensatory damages caused by the wrongful act of a servant or agent acting within the scope of the 
agency.”); Nancy J. Whitmore, Vicarious Liability and the Private University Student Press, 11 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 255, 259 (2006) (“It is often said an agency relationship consists of three elements: consent 
by the principal and agent, control by the principal, and action by the agent on the principal’s behalf.”). 
35. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified several categories of expression that receive no First 
Amendment protection. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (identifying the 
categories of unprotected expression as incitement to violence, obscenity, defamation, speech integral 
to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats, and “speech presenting some 
grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 
535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain 
categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real 
children.”). 
36. See Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 963 (D. Mont. 2018) (finding that “the speech 
does not fall into a de facto unprotected category. And in fact Gersh does not contend that Anglin’s 
speech falls within one of the few ‘historic and traditional categories of expression long familiar to the 
bar’ for which content-based restrictions on speech are clearly permitted” (quoting Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 
717)). 
37. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg, the Court held: 
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action. 
Id. at 447. Under this test for incitement to violence or unlawful conduct, speech is unprotected if three 
elements exist, including: “(1) intent (embodied in the requirement that such speech . . . be ‘directed to 
inciting or producing’ lawless action); (2) imminence (embodied in the phrase ‘imminent lawless 
action’); and (3) likelihood (embodied in the phrase ‘and is likely to incite or produce such action’).”  
Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Tort 
Cases?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446–47). 














Notably, Gersh was not the only troll-storm lawsuit against Anglin. 
Another case involved Taylor Dumpson.39 In 2017, Dumpson became the 
first African-American president of the student government at American 
University. 40  On the day she assumed this role, “bananas with hateful 
messages were found hanging from nooses”41 on campus. This incident 
sparked a review by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.42 
The racism Dumpson confronted, however, was not confined to campus; 
it quickly spread online.  
Dumpson sued Anglin for, among other causes of action, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress43 after he posted her “picture and personal 
information online and exhorted his followers to harass and bully her, a 
tactic he has also employed against Jewish and Muslim targets.”44 As with 
Gersh, Dumpson alleged that “a troll storm ensued.”45  She contended that 
she “feared for her safety amid the relentless harassment, and was 
eventually diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.”46   
As was the situation in Gersh, Andrew Anglin failed to defend against 
Taylor Dumpson’s lawsuit and default judgment was entered against him in 
August 2019.47 In brief, the crucial issue at the heart of this Commentary 
regarding vicarious tort liability for speech-sparked troll storms was never 
fully litigated or resolved in either Gersh or Dumpson. 
With this background in mind, Part I of this Commentary examines Chief 
U.S. District Judge Dana Christensen’s analysis of whether Andrew Anglin 
should be held tortiously responsible for the speech of others who harassed 
	
39. Complaint, Dumpson v. Ade, No. 1:18-CV-01011 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2018) [hereinafter 
Dumpson Complaint], https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DUMPSON-v-
Ade.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4NF-W8XL].  
40. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Nooses on the Fourth of July, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2017, at A2; see 
Press Release, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Landmark Settlement Between Hate 
Incident Perpetrator and Survivor Announced in Dumpson v. Ade (Dec. 18, 2018), https://lawyerscommi 
ttee.org/landmark-settlement-between-hate-incident-perpetrator-and-survivor-announced-in-dumpson-
v-ade/ [https://perma.cc/UE56-CGAC] (noting that in March 2017, Dumpson “was elected as American 
University’s first female African American student body president”). 
41. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Caitlin Dickerson, Nooses, Potent Symbols of Hate, Crop Up in Rash 
of Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2017, at A11. 
42. Jacey Fortin, F.B.I. Helping American University Investigate Bananas Found Hanging from 
Nooses, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/us/bananas-hang-from-black 
-nooses-and-a-campus-erupts-in-protest.html [https://perma.cc/QX2D-HK5Q]. 
43. See Dumpson Complaint, supra note 39, at 58–60 (setting forth the cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress).  
44. Karen Zraick, Student Settles with Her Racist Online Harasser, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2018, 
at A27. 
45. Dumpson Complaint, supra note 39, at 2. 
46. Zraick, supra note 44, at A27. 
47. Dumpson v. Ade, No. 18-1011, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134011, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 
2019). 











Tanya Gersh.48 In the process, it also dissects Anglin’s arguments against 
imposing vicarious liability and explores the vicarious liability standard 
developed in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.49 more than thirty-five 
years ago. Part II then addresses, within a much broader First Amendment 
framework, the question of vicarious liability in other speech-based cases, 
as well as a possible dichotomy between ideas and instructions.50 Finally, 
Part III concludes by suggesting criteria for courts to use when evaluating 
vicarious liability issues that arise at the intersection of First Amendment 
jurisprudence and tort law.51 
I. GERSH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT & VICARIOUS LIABILITY: EXAMINING 
JUDGE CHRISTENSEN’S REASONING 
To better understand whether Andrew Anglin should, consistent with 
First Amendment principles of free expression, be held vicariously liable in 
tort law for the speech of Daily Stormer readers who targeted Tanya Gersh, 
it helps to unpack the issue into two sub-questions: 
1. Does the First Amendment give absolute protection to Andrew Anglin 
from tort liability if his speech does not fall into an unprotected category of 
expression, such as incitement52 or true threats?53 
2. If the First Amendment does not shield Anglin from tort liability, then 
what is necessary to hold him vicariously liable for the tortious speech of 
third parties? 
Section A addresses the first sub-question. Section B then addresses the 
second. 
	
48. See infra notes 52–123 and accompanying text. 
49. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
50. See infra notes 124–179 and accompanying text. 
51. See infra notes 180–219 and accompanying text. 
52. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (setting forth the U.S. Supreme Court’s current test 
for incitement to unlawful conduct). 
53. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (observing that “the First Amendment . . . 
permits a State to ban a ‘true threat,’” and providing that such threats “encompass those statements where 
the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals” (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
705, 708 (1969))); see generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Linda Riedemann Norbut, #I🔫U: 
Considering the Context of Online Threats, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1885, 1889–90 (2018) (noting that 
although the Supreme Court has held that true threats are not protected by the First Amendment, it has 
not answered “fundamental questions regarding the ‘true threats exception’ to First Amendment 
protection, including whether courts should view threats from the vantage of the speaker, a reasonable 
recipient, a reasonable disinterested reader, or all of the above; and what mens rea the First Amendment 













A. Tort Liability for Otherwise Protected Speech 
Turning to the first sub-question—whether the First Amendment shelters 
Anglin from all tort liability if his speech does not fall within an unprotected 
category of expression—Professor David Anderson calls it sometimes 
“difficult to square the demands of the First Amendment with the methods 
of tort law.”54 This is particularly true when “the claim arises from the 
content of speech that would be fully protected by the First Amendment if 
it were not tortious.”55 
Indeed, that was precisely the situation in Gersh; Anglin contended he 
should not be held tortiously liable because his speech did not fit into a 
category of speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment.56 According 
to attorney Marc Randazza in his brief supporting Anglin’s motion to 
dismiss, “[e]very word uttered by Mr. Anglin in this public dispute is 
protected by the First Amendment, no matter how many people find those 
views intolerable.” 57  Notably, Judge Christensen, in fact, agreed that 
Anglin’s “speech does not fall into a de facto unprotected category.”58 
Concluding that speech may be protected by the First Amendment, 
however, does not eliminate the possibility that its speaker can be held liable 
in tort law.  
Another federal district court judge recently explained this principle in 
Stricklin v. Stefani.59 There, Judge Robert Conrad, Jr. refused in December 
2018 to dismiss a negligence claim against No Doubt singer Gwen Stefani.60 
During a concert, the singer had urged audience members to move closer to 
the stage, thereby precipitating a fan’s injuries caused by the throngs coming 
forward.61 In refusing to dismiss the case, Conrad wrote, 
	
54. David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 
757 (2004). 
55. Id. at 758. 
56. Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 963 (D. Mont. 2018). 
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60. See id. at 536 (“Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Stefani may proceed to trial.”). 
61. Stefani told the crowd at a July 2016 concert in Charlotte, North Carolina: 
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Stefani asserts that because her statements do not fall into one of the 
exceptions to the First Amendment, she cannot be held liable in tort. 
The Court agrees that Stefani’s statements do not fall squarely within 
one of the previously recognized categorical exemptions to First 
Amendment protection. However, the Court disagrees that the First 
Amendment immunizes all other speech falling outside these 
categories, including negligent speech which results in bodily injury 
to others.62 
For Judge Conrad in Stricklin, the relevant inquiry for deciding if Stefani 
could be held tortiously liable for her words was “to examine [her] 
statements and surrounding circumstances and weigh how those statements 
either further or hinder the principles and purposes undergirding the First 
Amendment. In all First Amendment cases, this is the central inquiry.”63   
Judge Christensen in Gersh took a similar approach. He reasoned that 
whether Andrew Anglin could be held responsible in tort law for his speech 
depended largely on whether it was about a matter of private interest or 
public concern, with speech falling into the former category—private 
speech—not being immune from liability.64 
This consideration comports with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
determination in Snyder v. Phelps65  that the speech of members of the 
Westboro Baptist Church was sheltered from tort liability because it dealt 
with matters of public concern.66 As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for 
the Snyder majority, “[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits holding 
Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that 
speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the 
circumstances of the case.”67 
In Gersh, Judge Christensen concluded the plaintiff “made a plausible 
claim that Anglin’s speech involved a matter of strictly private concern.”68 
The judge reasoned here that: 
Anglin launched a campaign of unrelated personal attacks on a 
Whitefish realtor, her husband, and their son because of a perceived 
conflict between Gersh and the mother of Anglin’s friend, another 
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white supremacist. Although Anglin drew heavily on his readers’ 
hatred and fear of ethnic Jews, rousing their political sympathies, 
there is more than a colorable claim that he did so strictly to further 
his campaign to harass Gersh.69 
Anglin had averred that “Gersh injected herself into a matter of public 
concern by discussing the sale of Sherry Spencer’s building with 
Spencer.” 70  The sale was arguably a matter of public concern because 
Sherry Spencer faced “boycotts related to her son’s notoriety.” 71 
Additionally, Anglin contended his words were about a public issue because 
“his speech about Gersh was both ‘in support of Richard Spencer’s speech 
in support of President Trump’ and ‘related to the growth of white 
nationalism in Whitefish, and the community’s response thereto.’”72 
These public-concern arguments failed to convince Judge Christensen, 
at least at the motion-to-dismiss phase under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.73 He found that: 
[C]onstruing the allegations in the Complaint as true, Anglin 
exploited the prejudices widely held among his readers to specifically 
target one individual. Moreover, the Court concludes that, at this 
stage of the litigation, it cannot agree with Anglin that his speech was 
indisputably tethered to Gersh’s conduct in engaging in a matter of 
public controversy.74 
In summary, Judge Christensen concluded that although Andrew 
Anglin’s speech did not fit within a category of expression unprotected by 
the First Amendment, it nonetheless was subject to tort liability because it 
did not clearly address a matter of public concern. More broadly, in both 
Gersh and Stricklin, federal district courts in 2018 concluded that the First 
Amendment did not shield from tort liability speakers who urged others to 
take action despite their words not rising to the level of an unprotected 
incitement.  
This result in Gersh led Judge Christensen to address the second sub-
question noted at the start of this part of the Commentary: If the First 
Amendment does not shield Anglin from tort liability, then what—
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consistent with First Amendment principles—is necessary to hold him 
vicariously liable for the tortious speech acts of third parties? 
B. Vicarious Liability for the Tortious Speech of Others 
On the issue of vicarious liability, Judge Christensen again focused on 
the fact that “Anglin was not speaking on a matter of public 
concern.”75 Christensen thus determined Anglin’s speech was not “within 
the core of the First Amendment.”76 This meant, in brief, that vicarious 
liability was at least possible in Gersh. To determine whether, in fact, it 
should be imposed on Anglin, the judge turned to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1982 ruling in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 77  Christensen 
concluded, as explained below, that Claiborne Hardware “advance[d] 
Gersh’s theory”78 regarding vicarious liability. 
Claiborne Hardware centered on the boycott of white merchants by 
black citizens in Claiborne County, Mississippi, in the 1960s.79 In response 
to the boycott, Claiborne Hardware Co. and several other boycotted 
businesses sued “to recover losses caused by the boycott and to enjoin future 
boycott activity.”80 A key First Amendment issue was whether those who 
spoke in favor of the boycott should be held liable to the targeted white 
merchants because their speech “was used to further the aims of the 
boycott.”81 It is worth noting that some of this speech allegedly threatened 
various forms of retaliation against black citizens who failed to join the 
boycott.82 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the speech at issue involved the 
exercise of protected First Amendment rights.83 Yet, it also noted that a 
“[g]overnmental regulation that has an incidental effect on First 
Amendment freedoms may be justified in certain narrowly defined 
instances.”84 In brief, Claiborne Hardware pitted the government’s “broad 
power to regulate economic activity”85—the Court noted on this point that 
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boycotts “may have a disruptive effect on local economic conditions”86—
against the First Amendment freedoms of speech, peaceable assembly, and 
petition.87 
The vicarious liability issue thus pivoted on whether the defendants—
those who called for the boycott—should be held responsible for the 
conduct of the actual boycotters whose actions, in failing to patronize the 
plaintiffs’ businesses, caused those businesses economic harm. Delivering 
the Court’s opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens stressed that “the presence 
of activity protected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the 
grounds that may give rise to damages liability and on the persons who may 
be held accountable for those damages.”88  In other words, because the 
defendants engaged in protected speech—assembly and petition activities 
while calling for the boycott—their liability for damages wrought by the 
boycotters needed to be restrained due to the First Amendment. 
Examining the vicarious liability issue, the Court focused on the speech 
of defendant Charles Evers.89  Evers was field secretary of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Mississippi.90 He 
drew special attention because he allegedly “threatened violence on a 
number of occasions against boycott breakers.” 91  In one instance, he 
purportedly proclaimed: “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist 
stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”92 
The Court rejected imposing liability on Evers. 93  Justice Stevens 
explained that “[t]o the extent that Evers caused respondents to suffer 
business losses through his organization of the boycott, his emotional and 
persuasive appeals for unity in the joint effort, or his ‘threats’ of vilification 
or social ostracism, Evers’ conduct is constitutionally protected and beyond 
the reach of a damages award.”94 The Court zeroed in on the fact that Evers’ 
pro-boycott speeches “predominantly contained highly charged political 
rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendment.”95 
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Justice Stevens suggested, however, that Evers might nonetheless be 
held “liable for the unlawful conduct of others” 96  if either: 1) “he 
authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity,”97  or 2) if his 
speech constituted an unlawful incitement to violence under Brandenburg98 
and such “unlawful conduct . . . in fact followed within a reasonable 
period.”99  As to the latter possibility, the Court concluded that Evers’s 
speech did not amount to unprotected incitement per Brandenburg.100 It 
emphasized that “mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not 
remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment.”101 
As to the former theory for vicarious liability, the Court also rejected 
culpability for Evers.102 It reasoned: 
If there were other evidence of his authorization of wrongful conduct, 
the references to discipline in the speeches could be used to 
corroborate that evidence. But any such theory fails for the simple 
reason that there is no evidence—apart from the speeches 
themselves—that Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened 
acts of violence.103 
Put differently, the Court searched for outside or extrinsic evidence—
evidence beyond the words in Evers’s speeches—that he authorized, 
directed, or ratified acts of violence against those who failed to boycott 
white merchants. It found such evidence lacking, thereby precluding the 
possibility that Evers was liable for others’ allegedly unlawful acts. 
The Court similarly examined whether the NAACP, which helped to 
organize the boycott, could be found liable for the unlawful conduct of 
others, including NAACP members who were not acting in an agency 
capacity.104 Here, the Court determined that “[t]o impose liability without a 
finding that the NAACP authorized—either actually or apparently—or 
ratified unlawful conduct would impermissibly burden the rights of political 
association that are protected by the First Amendment.”105 In short, the 
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Court rejected the theory of “guilt by association”106 and, instead, required 
evidence of authorization or ratification for the NAACP to be held liable. 
Such evidence against it was, just as it was for Charles Evers, absent.107 
In Gersh, Judge Christensen used Claiborne Hardware against Andrew 
Anglin in two ways. First, the judge emphasized that while the speech in 
Claiborne Hardware largely dealt with a matter of public concern—racial 
discrimination—and thus merited heightened First Amendment protection, 
Anglin’s speech lacked such legitimacy.108 Christensen explained that: 
Anglin was not speaking on a matter of public concern. The First 
Amendment is considerably more concerned with a concerted action 
to address racial discrimination than it is with the ethnic background 
and contact information of a realtor who was arguably involved in a 
real estate dispute with the mother of Richard Spencer.109 
In other words, Claiborne Hardware and Gersh are factually distinct, 
with the speech in the former case more deserving of First Amendment 
protection against vicarious liability. Additionally, Christensen pointed out 
that while the unlawful conduct of neck breaking allegedly advocated in 
Claiborne Hardware did not occur, the called-for conduct actually 
transpired in Gersh.110 
Perhaps more significant than drawing such factual distinctions, 
Christensen applied Claiborne Hardware’s test that speakers may be liable 
for the tortious activity of others if they “authorized, directed, or ratified”111 
it. Specifically, Christensen called the Claiborne Hardware standard “a 
mirror”112  of “Montana’s substantial assistance test.”113  That test allows 
recovery of damages “from a defendant for the tortious conduct of another 
when the defendant ‘knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of 
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct himself.’” 114  Bridging the two tests, Christensen wrote that 
“liability may follow when an individual ‘authorized’ or ‘directed’ ‘specific 
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tortious activity’—the ‘breach of duty’ required to satisfy the substantial 
assistance test under Montana law.”115 
Applying this standard, the judge held that, at least at the motion-to-
dismiss stage, Tanya Gersh could proceed with her claim that Anglin was 
liable for the speech of his readers.116  Critical to this outcome was his 
determination that: 
Anglin expressly summoned a troll storm, publishing personal and 
professional contact information for the Gersh family, and offering 
samples of the types of anti-Semitic and misogynistic messages his 
readers should leave. He oversaw a discussion board on his website, 
in which he interacted with readers who posted comments about their 
trolling tactics.117 
According to Christensen, the objective indicators that Anglin allegedly 
had, to use Claiborne Hardware’s phrasing, “authorized, directed, or 
ratified specific tortious activity”118 of his readers were that he: 
• provided readers with the addresses and numbers necessary to make 
direct, personal contact with Tanya Gersh; 
• drafted and made available to readers examples of the messages 
they should send to Gersh; and 
• interacted online with readers who trolled Gersh.119 
Therefore, the conduct of “at least some of Anglin’s followers”120 in 
bombarding Tanya Gersh with unwanted messages was imputable to Anglin 
and, in turn, supported causes of action against him for invasion of privacy 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.121 As noted earlier, neither 
the vicarious liability nor the tort issues were fully litigated because Anglin 
stopped defending against the lawsuit and default judgment was entered 
against him.122 
The next part explores the subject of vicarious liablity in greater detail 
from a macro-level perspective, stretching beyond the factual confines of 
Gersh v. Anglin. Specifically, it examines the difference between ideas and 
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instructions, as well as a values-based approach for triggering heightened 
First Amendment protection,123 as possible analytical keys for deciding if 
vicarious liability should be imposed on speakers who urge others to take 
actions that tortiously harm plaintiffs. 
II. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY: 
FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES AND OTHER CASES 
A starting point for critiquing Judge Christensen’s analysis of vicarious 
liability in Gersh is to reflect back on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
dissent nearly ninety-five years ago in Gitlow v. New York.124 In considering 
whether Benjamin Gitlow had committed the offense of criminal anarchy 
for disseminating a document called “The Left Wing Manifesto,” Holmes 
contended that: 
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed 
it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of 
energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between 
the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense 
is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to 
reason.125 
This language, as Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in 1970, is “often 
quoted but at least as often disregarded.”126 It arguably suggests, by its 
“unqualified language,”127 that any statement—more precisely, any idea—
carries the potential to spark some form of action by someone somewhere128 
and that, in turn, “the very proposition that incitement differ[s] from other 
kinds of speech [i]s illusory.”129 
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Today, however, a distinction is drawn. Only an idea that “is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action”130 constitutes an incitement not protected by the First 
Amendment. Furthermore, as noted earlier, speech that supposedly triggers 
the tortious actions of others may, in fact, not rise to the level of unprotected 
incitement under Brandenburg, as was the situation in Gersh.131 
The difficulty with imposing vicarious liability for speech urging action 
in non-employer-employee settings is that “we can never be sure what 
actually is the trigger”132 of someone else’s conduct. Put differently, and to 
use the Supreme Court’s phrase in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n,133 it is extremely difficult to prove “a direct causal link”134 between 
the defendant-speaker’s words and the subsequent tortious conduct of others 
who saw or heard them. That is a key problem because, as Professor Joseph 
Russomanno writes, “[a]t the heart of any concern about speech is its 
possible effect.” 135  Deploying a test for vicarious liability, such as 
Claiborne Hardware’s “authorized, directed, or ratified”136 standard that 
was embraced in Gersh, therefore serves as a rough proxy for when it is 
legally sufficient to hold that a defendant’s speech caused—and thus the 
defendant should be held responsible for—the tortious speech or conduct of 
others with whom he or she has no agency relationship. 
Although Justice Holmes’s assertion that every idea is an incitement fails 
to provide a clear analytical guide for vicarious tort liability, it is 
nonetheless useful in another way. Specifically, it centers on ideas—the 
notion that every idea is an incitement. Ideas, however, might be contrasted 
with instructions. In other words, perhaps there is a meaningful difference 
between ideas—the idea of attacking Tanya Gersh through hateful, anti-
Semetic messages—and instructions—providing direct contact information 
and sample scripts for how one can and should communicate with Tanya 
Gersh—that are integral for tortious conduct. 
Although this is not a clean dichotomy, courts have imposed liability on 
	
130. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
131. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
132. Dow, supra note 128, at 743. 
133. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
134. Id. at 799. The direct-causal-link standard was applied again by the Court in United States v. 
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). The Court in Alvarez wrote that “[t]here must be a direct causal link 
between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.” Id. at 725; see generally Clay Calvert 
& Matthew D. Bunker, An “Actual Problem” in First Amendment Jurisprudence? Examining the 
Immediate Impact of Brown’s Proof-of-Causation Doctrine on Free Speech and Its Compatibility with 
the Marketplace Theory, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 391 (2013) (providing an analysis of the 
direct-causal-link standard and some of the problems with its implementation). 
135. Joseph Russomanno, Cause and Effect: The Free Speech Transformation as Scientific 
Revolution, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 213, 215 (2015). 













speakers for the tortious actions of others in instruction scenarios. For 
example, the Supreme Court of California in Weirum v. RKO General, 
Inc.137 in 1975 held that the First Amendment did not shield a Los Angeles 
radio station from tort liability after a teenage listener “negligently forced a 
car off the highway, killing its sole occupant.”138 At the time of the accident, 
the listener was trying to win a cash-prize radio contest that required 
locating a disc jockey who was driving around and providing tips on his 
whereabouts.139 For instance, at one point the disc jockey said: 
The Real Don Steele is in the Valley near the intersection of Topanga 
and Roscoe Boulevard, right by the Loew’s Holiday Theater—you 
know where that is at, and he’s standing there with a little money he 
would like to give away to the first person to arrive and tell him what 
type car I helped Robert W. Morgan give away yesterday morning at 
KHJ.140 
The Supreme Court of California had little problem finding the radio 
station owed a duty of care to the deceased individual because it was 
reasonably foreseeable an accident might be caused by those listening to the 
disc jockey.141 Much as Andrew Anglin repeatedly urged his readers to 
contact Tanya Gersh, 142  the radio station engaged in “repeated 
importuning” 143  to locate the disc jockey, thereby amounting to “no 
commonplace invitation.”144 And much like Andrew Anglin’s followers on 
the Daily Stormer might have been particularly susceptible to following his 
instructions if they shared Anglin’s apparent belief system about Jews, the 
Supreme Court of California in Weirum paid special attention to the fact that 
the “extensive teenage audience”145 of the radio station was especially likely 
to be influenced by the disc jockey.146 
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In rejecting the station’s First Amendment argument, the Supreme Court 
of California called it “clearly without merit.”147 According to the court, 
“[t]he issue here is civil accountability for the foreseeable results of a 
broadcast which created an undue risk of harm to decedent. The First 
Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely 
because achieved by word, rather than act.”148 In brief, the radio station was 
held vicariously liable for the negligent actions of a third-party listener with 
whom it lacked an agency or employer-employee relationship.149  
If actively and repeatedly encouraging and urging a specific action, 
accompanied by instructions about where to find a car, can result in such 
vicarious tort liability for the speaker in Weirum,150 then perhaps this paves 
a path for holding Andrew Anglin accountable for repeatedly urging the 
allegedly tortious actions committed by his readers and for providing the 
email and social media addresses for doing so. Although Judge Christensen 
in Gersh did not reference or cite Weirum, its logic should not be 
overlooked. 
The December 2018 decision in Stricklin v. Stefani151 described earlier152 
provides another example of an instructions case resulting in tort liability 
for a speaker who triggered others’ actions. In Stricklin, the plaintiff alleged 
being “trampled and forcibly pushed into a wall”153 not by defendant Gwen 
Stefani, but instead by third parties who followed Stefani’s invitation to 
move closer to the stage.154 Thus, just as in Gersh v. Anglin and Weirum v. 
RKO General, the plaintiff attempted to hold the defendant-speaker 
tortiously liable for the acts of others who directly harmed the plaintiff. 
Judge Robert Conrad, Jr. in Stricklin cited Weirum favorably in holding 
Gwen Stefani liable for negligence.155  As he described it, Stefani gave 
“concert directions”156 when she “invited the audience to come forward.”157 
Linking Weirum and Stricklin, the judge wrote, 
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[T]he issue is civil accountability for the foreseeable results of 
Stefani’s in-person invitation to patrons to move toward the stage, 
which created an undue risk of harm to Plaintiff and other patrons. 
The Weirum case involved the transmission of a contemporaneous 
invitation to listeners and a clear call to action. In fact, Plaintiff’s case 
is even stronger on the foreseeability prong because Stefani’s 
announcement was made to listeners in her immediate presence 
rather than through a medium such as the radio or television.158 
The last part of his analysis raises another issue about vicarious liability: 
Should it make a legal difference if the third parties who allegedly followed 
the defendant-speaker’s words were physically present and in immediate 
proximity to the speaker when the words were uttered? If such 
contemporaneous physical and temporal presence militates for imposing 
vicarious liability, then this works against holding a speaker such as Andrew 
Anglin liable. Physical presence between speaker and audience, as well as 
temporal contemporaneousness between the utterance of speech and its 
receipt, is lacking in Gersh.  
Furthermore, unlike in Stricklin where acting on the speaker’s words was 
almost immediately necessary if one wanted a closer seat, there was no 
immediate need to act upon reading Anglin’s Internet-posted words if one 
wanted to harass Tanya Gersh. Readers of Anglin’s words had time to 
rationally reflect on and to consider them carefully and deliberately before 
deciding whether to act on them.159 This arguably militates against holding 
Anglin vicariously liable because it suggests the third-party actors had 
greater control over their actions. 
In addition to the above explanation, Judge Conrad also made it clear 
that imposing vicarious liability on Gwen Stefani was permissible because 
her speech did not further an important First Amendment value such as “the 
exposition of ideas, search for truth, and the vitality of a society.”160 Instead, 
he determined her words “actually disserve society by creating the potential 
for disorder and danger.”161 Because Stefani’s speech did not advance “the 
	
158. Id.  
159. The belief that individuals can reflect upon speech before acting or speaking was noted 
recently by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) 
(“A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they 
can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.” (emphasis added)).  
160. See Stricklin, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 527. Judge Conrad reasoned that “Stefani’s statement was 
intended to prompt action; it was not intended to further the marketplace of ideas or to aid in ‘the 
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.’” Id. at 528 (quoting Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984)). 
161. Id. at 527. 











principles and purposes undergirding the First Amendment,”162 holding her 
responsible for the acts of others did not raise a constitutional concern. 
This tack tracks former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post’s position 
that “First Amendment coverage is triggered by those forms of social 
interaction that realize First Amendment values.”163 This, in turn, recalls 
considerations of high and low value speech espoused by the Supreme Court 
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire164 and the related proposition that low-
value categories of speech receive either no First Amendment protection or 
“can be regulated on the basis of their content without having to satisfy strict 
scrutiny.”165 As Post writes, “[d]ifferent kinds of speech embody different 
constitutional values, and each kind of speech should receive constitutional 
protections appropriate to the value it embodies.”166 
Furthermore, a values-based approach for determining when something 
raises true First Amendment concerns resonates in dissents in both the 2018 
U.S. Supreme Court cases of National Institute of Family and Life 
Advocates v. Becerra167 and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees.168 In Becerra, Justice Stephen Breyer authored 
a dissent joined by fellow liberal-leaning justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.169 He suggested that heightened First 
Amendment review applies only in cases when certain “widely accepted 
First Amendment goals” 170  are served and when “the true value of 
protecting freedom of speech”171 is at stake. 
In Janus, Justice Kagan penned a dissent for the same bloc of justices.172 
She opined that the First Amendment was meant “to protect democratic 
governance”173 and that, in turn, heightened First Amendment concerns are 
	
162. Id. at 530. 
163. Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
713, 716 (2000). 
164. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinksy, the Court declared that some categories of speech serve 
“no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” 
Id. at 572; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 189, 194 (1983) (noting that “[t]he ‘low’ value theory first appeared in the famous dictum of 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire”).  
165. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2171 
(2015). 
166. Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 
181–82 (2015). 
167. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
168. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
169. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
170. Id. at 2382. 
171. Id. at 2383 (emphasis added). In Becerra, Justice Breyer suggested that such values include 
protecting unpopular ideas from suppression and safeguarding the marketplace of ideas to facilitate the 
search for truth. Id. at 2382. 
172. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 













not raised by “workaday economic and regulatory policy.” 174  Kagan 
concluded that judges should not be “weaponizing the First Amendment . . . 
to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.”175 Viewed collectively, 
both the dissents in Becerra and Janus suggest that heightened First 
Amendment concerns for safeguarding speech only arise when the speech 
at issue serves certain values. 
In a nutshell, Judge Conrad’s logic in Stricklin that imposing vicarious 
liability on Gwen Stefani was permissible because her speech did “not 
further the exposition of ideas, search for truth, and the vitality of a 
society”176 tracks a values-based approach for potential First Amendment 
protection that reverberates all the way from Chaplinsky through and 
including the 2018 dissents in Becerra and Janus. As applied to vicarious 
liability cases such as Gersh, Weirum, and Stricklin, a values-based 
methodology suggests a court has greater power to impose such 
responsibility on a speaker for the actions of third parties if the speech in 
question: 
1) is not about a matter of public concern—a consideration Judge 
Christensen examined in Gersh,177 and 
2) does not serve a core First Amendment value such as discovery of 
truth in the marketplace of ideas178 or facilitating self-governance in 
a democratic society.179 
With this deeper analysis of possible approaches to vicarious liability in 
mind, the Commentary next concludes by suggesting a framework for 
courts to use in future cases when a speaker’s words urging action allegedly 
	
174. Id. at 2501.  
175. Id. In other words, Justice Kagan believes First Amendment safeguards apply with full force 
when speech affecting democratic self-governance is at stake, but not when speech is regulated only 
incidentally by laws that serve larger economic policy interests. 
176. Stricklin v. Stefani, 358 F. Supp. 3d 516, 527 (W.D.N.C. 2018). 
177. See supra notes 64–74 and accompanying text. 
178. The marketplace of ideas theory is “one of the most powerful images of free speech, both for 
legal thinkers and for laypersons.”  MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST 
AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001). It is premised on the 
belief that free expression “contributes to the promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of 
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003). 
179. The U.S. Supreme Court observed more than a half-century ago: 
 Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures 
and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, 
and all such matters relating to political processes. 
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND 
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948) (suggesting that the ultimate aim of free speech “is the 
voting of wise decisions,” and contending that voters “must be made as wise as possible”). 











cause the tortious conduct of others with whom the speaker lacks an agency 
relationship. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A FEDERAL RULE 
When First Amendment and tort law principles collide, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has, in some instances, created specific rules limiting the reach of 
state tort law.180 Most notably, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,181 the 
Court adopted what it called “a federal rule” to address the appropriate fault 
standard in libel cases brought by public officials regarding their official 
conduct.182 The Court held in Sullivan that such plaintiffs cannot recover 
unless they prove that the allegedly defamatory “statement was made with 
‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”183 In essence, the Sullivan Court 
began the “constitutionalization of tort law,”184 making it clear that “private 
law rules restricting speech were subject to constitutional restrictions.”185 In 
the process, the Court “radically limited the scope of defamation law in the 
United States.”186 
Although the federal rule of actual malice is now openly questioned by 
Justice Clarence Thomas,187 the Court has also applied it as a mandated First 
	
180. First Amendment principles are allowed to cabin and confine tort rules because “under the 
Supremacy Clause, federal constitutional law trumps contrary state tort law.” Thomas B. Colby, The 
Constitutionalization of Torts?, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 357 (2016). 
181. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
182. Id. at 279. 
183. Id. at 279–80. 
184. Paul A. LeBel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment 
Protection from Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145, 
1149 (1996). 
185. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1887, 1902 (2010). 
186. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 885 (2013). 
187. Justice Thomas in February 2019 called Sullivan’s adoption of the actual malice rule and 
later Supreme Court decisions that extended its application to other scenarios “policy-driven decisions 
masquerading as constitutional law.” McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the denial of certiorari). Thomas’s concern, particularly as it involves stretching actual 
malice’s application from the realm of public-official plaintiffs to the domain of public-figure plaintiffs, 
is that “[n]one of these decisions made a sustained effort to ground their holdings in the Constitution’s 
original meaning.” Id. at 677–78. As Thomas put it, “[t]here are sound reasons to question whether either 
the First or Fourteenth Amendment, as originally understood, encompasses an actual-malice standard 
for public figures or otherwise displaces vast swaths of state defamation law.” Id. at 680. Thomas 
concluded that: 
We did not begin meddling in this area until 1964, nearly 175 years after the First Amendment 
was ratified. The States are perfectly capable of striking an acceptable balance between 
encouraging robust public discourse and providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm. 
We should reconsider our jurisprudence in this area. 













Amendment rule in IIED tort cases188 involving satirical speech that causes 
harm. Specifically, the Court ruled in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell189 
that: 
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications 
such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the 
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 
“actual malice,” i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or 
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.190 
Furthermore, as described earlier,191  the Supreme Court in Snyder v. 
Phelps192 appeared to adopt another federal rule—that speech addressing 
matters of public concern 193  while conveyed “on public property, in a 
peaceful manner”194 is shielded from tort liability. As Chief Justice John 
Roberts wrote for the majority, “Given that Westboro’s speech was at a 
public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special 
protection’ under the First Amendment.”195 
The issue now becomes, in light of cases such as Gersh and Dumpson 
involving Internet-triggered troll storms, whether the Supreme Court should 
adopt a new federal rule for vicarious tort liability when a speaker urges 
others to commit acts later deemed tortious but the speaker’s words do not 
fall into a category of speech unprotected by the First Amendment. This 
Commentary advocates supplementing the Claiborne Hardware test, which 
asks whether a speaker-defendant “authorized, directed, or ratified specific 
tortious activity,”196 because it was developed well before the advent of the 
Internet and when Andrew Anglin became “the trollmaster of the alt-
right.”197 
Importantly, the narrow focus here—exactly as it is in the cases of Gersh, 
Dumpson, Stricklin, and Weirum—is liability premised on an individual 
speaker’s words urging others to take action. These types of cases stand in 
contrast to a distinct line of copycat and how-to disputes—ones not at issue 
	
188. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (addressing the elements of IIED). 
189. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
190. Id. at 56. 
191. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
192. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
193. See id. at 451 (“Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its 
speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by 
all the circumstances of the case.”). 
194. Id. at 460. 
195. Id. at 458. 
196. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982). 
197. O’Brien, supra note 25. 











in this Commentary—involving tort liability for the producers and 
publishers of speech products such as movies, 198  video games, 199 
instructional books,200  educational articles, 201  and musical albums202  for 
allegedly causing violence and death.203 
What, then, should courts do when it comes to vicarious liability in 
scenarios where a speaker urges others with whom he or she lacks an agency 
relationship to engage in conduct later deemed tortious? The approach 
offered below is merely one potential method for addressing this question. 
It builds from cases and principles addressed earlier in this Commentary. 
This proffered tack, in turn, is simply a starting point for prospective 
consideration by scholars and jurists at a time when troll-storm cases such 
as Gersh v. Anglin and Dumpson v. Ade percolate through the court system. 
At bottom, every case involving potential vicarious liability for speech 
urging action must involve a fact-intensive inquiry into precisely what was 
said and the circumstances under which it was said. The “what was said” 
facet, this Commentary concludes, is pivotal for initially determining if the 
First Amendment should provide any form of protection from vicarious 
liability for a person’s speech that supposedly causes others to commit torts. 
In particular, adopting a First Amendment rule limiting vicarious 
liability seems most important when the speech relates to a matter of public 
	
198. See, e.g., Byers v. Edmondson, 826 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting tort liability 
against the director and producers of the film Natural Born Killers stemming from the actions of 
individuals who watched that film and supposedly were inspired by it to shoot the plaintiff); Olivia N. 
v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting tort liability in a case in 
which the plaintiff, a nine-year-old girl, “was attacked and forcibly ‘artificially raped’ with a bottle by 
minors at a San Francisco beach” who had watched the movie Born Innocent on an NBC-affiliated 
television station and allegedly imitated something they saw in it). 
199. See, e.g., James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the imposition 
of tort liability on the producers of several violent video games that allegedly caused fourteen-year-old 
Michael Carneal to shoot, wound, and kill several individuals at Heath High School in Paducah, 
Kentucky). 
200. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the First 
Amendment did not bar imposing civil liability on the publisher of a book called Hit Man: A Technical 
Manual for Independent Contractors after a reader of it murdered three people). 
201. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting 
tort liability against the publisher of a magazine based on the death of a fourteen-year-old boy who read 
an article entitled “Orgasm of Death” that described the practice of autoerotic asphyxia and then died 
while attempting to perform that act despite the article’s statement that the facts it presented were “solely 
for an educational purpose”). 
202. See, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting tort 
liability in a case involving a nineteen-year-old man who committed suicide while listening to a musical 
album recorded by singer John “Ozzy” Osbourne). 
203. Courts in this line of copycat and how-to cases typically adopt the Brandenburg incitement 
test when considering tort liability. See Juliet Dee, Basketball Diaries, Natural Born Killers and School 
Shootings: Should There Be Limits on Speech Which Triggers Copycat Violence?, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 
713, 715 (2000) (noting that in most of these scenarios, “courts have refused to consider whether the 
media were ‘negligent,’ ruling instead that unless the media were guilty of ‘incitement’ as defined by 
First Amendment law, the media could not be held liable for the harm or injury despite the fact that the 













concern. The Supreme Court was particularly concerned with shielding such 
expression from tort liability in Snyder, 204  Sullivan, 205  and Falwell. 206 
Additionally, and as suggested by Judge Conrad’s analysis in Stricklin,207 if 
the speech serves a value that the First Amendment privileges, such as truth 
discovery or advancing democratic self-governance, then a federal rule 
providing at least some protection from vicarious liability for the acts of 
others seems justified. Thus, as a threshold matter under this proposed 
approach, First Amendment safeguards from vicarious liability come into 
play only when a defendant’s speech urging action: 1) directly relates208 to 
a matter of public concern, or 2) significantly serves209 an important First 
Amendment value.210 This constitutes step one. 
The next consideration in such cases where this threshold standard is 
satisfied is whether the First Amendment should afford defendant-speakers 
absolute protection from vicarious liability for torts committed by others. 
The danger with such an absolute-protection approach, however, is that a 
speaker may purposefully blend into his overall message words that directly 
relate to a matter of public concern or that significantly serve a First 
Amendment value as a mere pretext or ploy for triggering constitutional 
	
204. See supra notes 65–67, 192–195 and accompanying text (discussing Snyder v. Phelps). 
205. See supra notes 181–186 (discussing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan). The Court in Sullivan 
noted “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
206. See supra notes 189–190 (discussing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell). In Falwell, the 
Court emphasized that “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental 
importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.” Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). 
207. See supra notes 160–162. 
208. The phrase “directly relates” is strategically chosen because it prevents speech that is merely 
tangentially or peripherally related to a matter of public concern from receiving First Amendment 
protection in the face of tort liability. In other words, in attempting to strike a balance between tort 
interests in compensating individuals for harm and First Amendment interests of protecting speech, this 
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relating his or her speech urging action to a larger issue of public concern. 
209. The phrase “significantly serves” is strategically chosen because it prevents speech that 
barely or minimally serves a traditional First Amendment value from receiving First Amendment 
protection in the face of tort liability. An analogy in current First Amendment jurisprudence to such a 
requirement is the third prong of the Supreme Court’s test for obscenity under Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The third prong protects speech if it has “serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.” Id. (emphasis added). 
210. In cases involving speech that does not directly relate to a matter of public concern and that 
does not significantly serve a traditional First Amendment value, the general rules of the underlying tort 
would simply apply. For example, in the IIED cause of action against Andrew Anglin in Gersh v. Anglin, 
a court would simply apply the traditional elements of the IIED tort to Anglin’s behavior. In most states, 
under the traditional four elements of the IIED tort described earlier in note 1, this would entail asking 
whether: 1) urging a troll storm of the kind called for by Anglin was extreme and outrageous behavior; 
2) Anglin urged the troll storm with either the intention of causing Gersh to suffer emotional distress or 
with reckless disregard of doing so; 3) Tanya Gersh suffered emotional distress as a result of the troll 
storm that ensued; and 4) the distress that Gersh suffered was severe. 











protection. A message may be a wily hybrid of speech affecting a matter of 
public concern and urging others to act against a specific individual. These 
mixed-message scenarios demand closer scrutiny rather than a blanket rule 
precluding vicarious liability. Therefore, rather than ending the vicarious 
liability analysis after the first step and giving absolute protection to speech 
that directly relates to a matter of public concern or that significantly serves 
an important First Amendment value, a second step is essential. 
That second proposed step, this Commentary argues, is for a court to 
decide if there is clear and convincing evidence either that the speaker-
defendant, per the Supreme Court’s extant approach in Claiborne 
Hardware, “authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity”211 or, 
per the discussion in Part II regarding instructions, 212  repeatedly urged 
within a short period of time others to take specific and immediate action 
toward an identifiable individual while also providing detailed instructions 
facilitating how to do so. If either part of this disjunctive second step is 
found by a court to exist, then the First Amendment will not prevent the 
imposition of vicarious tort liability. If, however, neither part is held to exist, 
then the First Amendment shields a speaker who urges others to tortious 
action from vicarious liability for the others’ misdeeds. 
In unpacking this second step, the requirement that there must be clear 
and convincing evidence—something greater than a mere preponderance of 
the evidence213—to satisfy this part of the test comports with the federal rule 
of actual malice adopted in Sullivan. In Sullivan, the Court held that actual 
malice must be proved by “convincing clarity.”214 Clear and convincing 
evidence is synonymous today with convincing clarity.215 
 Ramping up the evidentiary requirement here is also designed to balance 
out the requirement in the threshold step that the defendant-speaker’s words 
must not merely relate to a matter of public concern or serve a traditional 
	
211. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982). 
212. See supra notes 132–158 and accompanying text. 
213. See Callahan v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 363 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Mass. 1977) (noting that 
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proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence, but less than the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt imposed in criminal cases”); Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1978) (opining 
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the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’”). 
214. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964). 
215. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971) (asserting that “New York 
Times held that in a civil libel action by a public official against a newspaper those guarantees required 
clear and convincing proof that a defamatory falsehood alleged as libel was” published with actual 
malice (emphasis added)); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986) (noting that the 













First Amendment value, but that they must do so directly 216  and 
significantly. 217  In other words, the heightened clear-and-convincing 
evidence standard on the second part of the proposed framework for 
vicarious liability tilts in favor of protecting First Amendment speech 
interests. In contrast, the heightened “directly relates”218 and “significantly 
serves”219 requirements on the threshold step lean in favor of serving the tort 
law interest in compensating plaintiffs for harm. 
The first prong of this disjunctive test was already established in 
Claiborne Hardware and thus requires no elaboration here. The second 
prong, however, is new and consequently needs fleshing out. In particular, 
the second prong, although not developed exclusively to address troll storm 
scenarios, was created with such situations in mind. It has several elements. 
They are explained below in an initial effort to give meaning to the terms 
used in the phrase “repeatedly urged within a short period of time others to 
take specific and immediate action toward an identifiable individual while 
also providing detailed instructions facilitating how to do so.” 
First, this prong only applies to repeated urgings. This requires, at 
minimum, the communication of at least two messages by the speaker-
defendant. This is designed to be free-speech friendly because it shields 
from vicarious tort liability a defendant who communicates only one 
message. The urgings, in turn, must be more than mere suggestions of 
possible action or equivocal musings about the potential for action. They 
must, instead, clearly encourage and advocate that readers engage in the 
conduct. 
Second, this prong requires that the communication of those messages 
occur within a short period of time. Rather than specify a precise cut-off 
period, such as within forty-eight hours, this is purposefully left flexible to 
provide a judge with discretion to consider the totality of the circumstances.  
Third, this prong mandates that the messages call for others to take 
specific and immediate action. This means both that the action called for 
must be described specifically and with particularity, and that the speaker 
urges it to take place immediately. The term “immediately” allows a judge 
some flexibility here compared to “instantaneously,” but clearly the 
inclusion in a message of phrases such as “act now” or “don’t wait” militate 
in favor of finding the message urged immediate action. 
Fourth, the message must urge action against an identifiable individual. 
In other words, had Andrew Anglin’s message said something akin to 
	
216. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra note 208. 
219. See supra note 209. 











“harass Jews,” it would not satisfy this requirement. Either directly naming 
a specific person or describing a specific person (but without naming her) 
in such precise detail that a reasonable reader of the messages would know 
who she is, however, would satisfy it. 
Fifth and finally, the second prong requires that the messages provide 
detailed instructions for facilitating the urged-for conduct. As in Gersh, 
providing addresses—social media or otherwise—and phone numbers for 
contacting the identifiable individual, along with suggestions or templates 
for what should be said to that individual, are relevant factors here in troll 
scenarios. Judges have discretion here to decide whether or not sufficient 
action-facilitating information has been provided to satisfy this criterion. 
There is not, in other words, a pre-defined quantity of what constitutes 
sufficient information. 
In summary, the proposed framework addresses the question of vicarious 
liability for speakers who urge actions by others that are allegedly tortious. 
It is merely an initial effort to provide one such possibility that attempts to 
balance tort law and the First Amendment freedom of speech, as cases akin 
to Gersh v. Anglin and Dumpson v. Ade are sure to arise in the near future. 
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